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ABSTRACT
The DoD Operationally Responsive Space Office is currently pursuing several initiatives involving small satellites
(<500 kg) to meet combatant commander needs. This paper examines specific technical rationales for why even
smaller satellites (1-200 kg) will be necessary if operational responsiveness similar to current aircraft operations is
to be achieved--fundamentally changing the concept of space system operations from today's approach.
RECENT TRENDS IN SMALL SATELLITE
DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION
Nature abounds with examples of living things evolving
to meet their natural environments. Scientists believe
that life on earth evolved from simple, single-celled
organisms that gradually metastasized into multi-celled
creatures and eventually into large, complex systems.
Living creatures today are a mix of these simple and
complex systems, but with higher-order species (plants
and animals) seemingly dominating the fold. However,
the geologic record also shows eras of great
extinction—where cataclysmic events such as asteroid
impacts or global warming/cooling—have wiped out
entire classes of organisms including the dinosaurs.
Through these earthshaking periods, the survival and
resiliency of simple systems (algae, phytoplankton,
insects, etc.) preserved life on the planet and allowed
for the eventual restoration of a full ecosystem,
including the higher-order species.

Advances in small satellite development over the last
decade have spurred initiatives such as Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) to address both space
protection needs as well as the challenge of breaking
the current laborious acquisition process. The ORS
Office at Kirtland AFB, NM, is chartered to provide
“assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of
Joint Force Commanders’ Needs.”1 Current efforts
include the ORS-1 satellite intended to augment
existing national overhead systems while focused on
the needs of DoD warfighting commands. The satellite,
derived from an existing Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL)-developed TacSat-3 satellite bus
and using off-the-shelf optical systems, is currently
being fielded by the Space Development and Test Wing
(SDTW) at Kirtland AFB and slated for launch in Fall
2010 after a 2-year development cycle. Additional
ORS Office-sponsored efforts, including the Naval
Research Laboratories’ (NRL) TacSat-4 tactical
communications demonstration, are showing that small
satellites (300-500 kilograms (kg)) can effectively meet
DoD warfighter needs with cost and schedule
parameters more responsive than current high-end
space systems—while providing technical performance
characterized as “good enough to win.” This satisficing
requirements strategy, rather than the exhaustive
analyses of alternatives and cost-optimization prevalent
in DoD acquisition, acknowledges the short (1-3 year)
intended operating life of ORS systems while allowing
for rapid technology insertion into newer platforms. 2
This approach is akin to “planned obsolescence” in
commercial consumer electronics and takes advantage
of recent improvements in low-cost satellite subsystems
and launch vehicles to achieve reasonable performance
at more modest costs.

Recent natural and man-made threats to U.S. military,
intelligence, civil, and commercial space systems have
raised the specter that today’s space architectures have
“evolved” to a position analogous with the dinosaurs—
highly optimized systems perfectly suited for the
current environment, but unable to adapt to unexpected
threats when and if they should arise. Today’s debate
regarding space protection hinges on the fact that the
United States currently fields small numbers of large,
exquisite satellites that, while incredibly capable in
meeting their design requirements, are increasingly
susceptible to enemy action, natural space weather
hazards, or other forms of deliberate or unintentional
interference.
Coupled with a decades-long
development and acquisition cycle, the United States
runs the risk of losing its space capabilities in conflict
or being deterred from achieving national security goals
if these systems are seen as threatened.

Nagy

1

24th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

Despite the attractiveness of currently-planned ORS
systems to meet urgent warfighter needs or provide
reconstitution and augmentation of high-end DoD space
systems, there are limits to what can be reasonably
expected from this class of satellites. Any aerospace
engineer can tell you that the cost of an aerospace
platform is directly proportional to its mass. In this
case, the cost of today’s 200-300 kg satellite is roughly
$20-40 million (M) for a basic design (and upwards of
$80-100M for satellites requiring more sophisticated
ISR payloads) with launcher costs ranging from $2040M depending on specific requirements. Including
ground command and control, data exploitation, and
other infrastructure, the cost of a single ORS mission in
this weight class will run somewhere between $50-200
million dollars.
While clearly attractive when
compared to the billions of dollars required to field a
high-end DoD space system, an adversary might
checkmate the United States in wartime if the cost to
negate this space capability is significantly less than its
replenishment costs.

miniaturization suggests there may yet be another way
if we are willing to “think small.”
The act of launching a satellite into space is an
inherently complex and dangerous process. The term
“rocket science” is not casually applied, since the task
of accelerating a vehicle to over 7 kilometers/second
and then operating remotely for weeks, months or years
in near-vacuum (with varying intensities of impinging
electromagnetic energy and thermal cycling) requires
enormous engineering, planning, and operations
discipline. Few non-engineers appreciate the subtlety
of the physics involved. The Tsiolkovsky Rocket
Equation (which relates the initial and final mass of a
rocket to its achievable velocity) is an exponential
relationship. The reason for staging on all rockets that
achieve orbital velocity is a direct consequence of this
fact—the rocket engineer operates on the ragged edge
of mass margins and structural materials strength to
minimize a rocket’s mass to place a given payload into
space. The heavier the payload, the more difficult the
problem becomes, with a complexity that appears to
take on exponential proportions of its own. Simply put,
smaller rockets are simpler, require fewer moving parts,
and obtain greater structural margins at a given throwweight based on today’s materials technology.

There is, however, substantial progress in the area of
microsat/nanosat/picosat development that suggests we
are on the verge of a technological tipping point for
exceedingly small satellites capable of meeting valid
operational requirements—while serving as the
“microorganisms” for space system survivability. This
trend is ultimately enabled by Moore’s Law and the
increasing processing power that can be delivered in
modern microelectronics.
Combined with other
benefits to related spacecraft subsystems resulting from
decreased size, this trend allows for radically different
space system architectures to evolve in ways that
enhance their survivability, persistence, resiliency, and
adaptability.

The interaction between satellites and launch vehicles is
also a complex one that dominates the technical
challenges associated with placing payloads into space.
Satellites must possess sufficient structural strength to
survive the accelerations from typical g-forces during
launch (routinely 3-8 times the force of earth’s gravity)
while at the same time minimizing the structural mass
required to ease performance requirements on the
launch vehicle. G-force (or static load) requirements
are not the only ones that satellites must endure—they
must also deal with severe shocks imparted from
staging/separation events and dynamic coupling
between the satellite(s) and the launch vehicle itself.
The latter concern (dynamic coupling) must be
considered when examining interactions between the
launch vehicle autopilot, propulsion subsystem, and
induced structural vibrations experienced throughout
the rocket. One phenomenon is famously known as
“pogo oscillation” when experienced on liquid-fuelled
launch vehicles, but similar concerns involving other
resonant frequency interactions on both liquid-fuelled
and solid-fuelled launch vehicles are also possible.3 A
computational modeling process known as Coupled
Loads Analysis (CLA) is most often used to prevent
such interactions from causing vehicle damage or
breakup in flight; however, using today’s methods, a
full CLA typically requires 12-24 months to complete.
Generally speaking, the stiffer the spacecraft is, the
easier the technical challenge becomes with integrating

LAUNCH VEHICLE INTEGRATION DRIVERS
The first American space satellites of the late 1950s and
early 1960s were small in size and capability—because
both the launcher and space electronics technology of
the day would not permit otherwise. As spacelift
capability improved, the size of satellites increased
along with their effectiveness and their complexity.
These trends drove improvements in on-orbit lifetimes
and reliability, which in turn drove the demand for
improved capabilities resulting in ever-heavier
satellites. As satellite mass (and cost) continued to
increase, this again drove increased demands for launch
vehicle performance and reliability. This “upward
spiral” of launch vehicle and satellite cost/complexity is
realized today in typical satellite development
timescales of over a decade—with costs in the billions
of dollars to place small numbers of heavy, complex
satellites into orbit for DoD and Intelligence
Community users. But Moore’s Law and the power of
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the satellite onto the rocket. An “infinitely stiff”
spacecraft (for a given, fixed mass) remains the
technological Holy Grail for satellite structural
engineers.

aerospace structural materials like aluminum or
titanium benefits from the significantly reduced
spacecraft volumes achievable at lower spacecraft
masses. Put another way, as a spacecraft grows in size
(volume) its mass grows proportionally in such a way
that the overall spacecraft stiffness that is achievable
given the engineering strength of materials goes
down—significantly so in the case of satellites
weighing in excess of 1000 kg at rest (1 g condition).
The smaller the satellite, the easier the task at hand
(almost absurdly so for spacecraft below 50 kg). In
layman’s terms, just because a model bridge made from
toothpicks can hold a mason’s brick doesn’t mean the
results will scale into a full-size bridge given an
equivalent load but the same building materials.

SPACECRAFT STIFFNESS—A CLOSER LOOK
Figure 1 is a scatter plot of spacecraft 1 st fundamental
(resonance) frequency versus mass for a number of
small satellites designed and orbited over the past
decade (data collected by the author). Two engineering
observations immediately stand out. First, the general
shape of the interpolated graph is hyperbolic (f(x) =
1/x)), which is not surprising given that specific
strength (or strength to weight ratio) of typical

Figure 1: Spacecraft Fundamental Frequency versus Mass (Data Collected by Author). Blue Line Represents
Average Frequency (6056 Hz kg/Mass).
The second observation is that the “knee” in this curve
appears somewhere in the range of 200 kilograms for a
1st fundamental frequency above 25-30 Hertz (Hz). In
practical terms, a spacecraft with a 1st fundamental
frequency above this value is much less likely to
experience dynamic coupling with its launch vehicle (or
just about any launch vehicle in the world’s inventory
today). Put another way, spacecraft that achieve this
minimum stiffness are more easily shifted from
launcher to launcher with minimum changes to the
systems engineering integration that is required. From
the graph, the size (and associated mass) of the
Nagy

spacecraft that consistently attains this minimum are
spacecraft weighing 200 kilograms or less.
Small spacecraft yield other engineering benefits that
scale positively with decreasing size and mass. While a
small spacecraft ultimately has less electrical power
available to it compared to traditional large spacecraft
(due to reduced surface area or deployed area for solar
arrays), the challenges associated with thermal load
dissipation are also remarkably easier. Operating in
vacuum, all satellites eventually rely on radiative
cooling to maintain operating temperature. On large3
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Designing satellites to fly on ESPA is not a “natural”
activity as any aerospace engineer can attest. Because
the original EELV specification left out any
requirement for secondary satellites, the ESPA design is
a deliberate attempt to minimize impacts to the primary
payload by simply raising the satellite 24 inches inside
the launch vehicle fairing. This requires the ESPA
satellites to hang cantilevered off the ESPA ring, so the
primary launch loads (up to 8.5 g’s) are transmitted
through their transverse axes as compared to traditional
satellites which experience their greatest loads in the
axial direction. Additionally, the ESPA satellites
experience a relatively severe shock environment (up to
400 g’s instantaneous at 1500 Hz) due to the stiffness of
the ESPA ring and the transmission of the primary
spacecraft separation loads. Despite these challenges,
the ability to build ESPA-class satellites capable of
surviving these launch environments yields substantial
benefits. The Ball Aerospace-built STP Standard
Interface Vehicle (SIV) is designed to ESPA standards
and is compatible not only with ESPA itself, but also
readily transfers to launches from Orbital Sciences
Corporation’s Pegasus, Minotaur I and Minotaur IV
launch vehicles (and possibly SpaceX Corporation’s
Falcon 1) with minimum impact and no structural
design changes. In fact, the first launch of SIV is
occurring in Summer 2010 (along with three other
microsatellites designed to ESPA standards) on the
STP-S26 small launch vehicle mission using a
Minotaur IV launch vehicle with a STP-sponsored
multi-payload adapter. This adapter holds the satellites
in a traditional (i.e., axially oriented) configuration.

volume satellites, complicated subsystems such as heat
pipes and preferential placement of hot, energyconsuming components are required to maintain
spacecraft thermal balance. The associated computer
modeling required to analyze on-orbit behavior is an
intensive engineering activity on most large spacecraft
programs. By comparison, the distances involved in
heat transfer on small satellites are short and relatively
straightforward conductive paths. Other spacecraft
subsystems benefit from similar decreases in
complexity at smaller scales, although this result is not
yet universally true (some subsystems have a
minimum-size “form factor” given the current state of
technology). As always, the cost and complexity of
individual satellites scales with their mass and volume.
ESPA-CLASS SATELLITE STANDARDS AND
IMPLICATIONS
Over the past decade, a new class of satellites has
emerged to take advantage of an emerging set of
standards established for the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adapter,
or ESPA. ESPA began as a Small Business Innovative
Research contract with CSA Engineering, Inc., as a
jointly sponsored effort of the DoD Space Test Program
(STP) and Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space
Vehicles Directorate to accommodate secondary
payloads on EELV. The ESPA ring as designed can
hold up to six 180 kg (maximum mass) satellites
inserted underneath the primary payload (Figure 2)4.
ESPA was demonstrated successfully on its maiden
flight in March 2007 during the STP-1 mission flown
on an Atlas 401 (Figure 3) and has also been flown
successfully as part of the NASA Lunar Crater
Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission
in 2009. In February 2008 the Secretary of the Air
Force directed that ESPA-hosted satellite operations be
normalized to support responsive spacelift; currently,
the EELV budget supports one ESPA flight per year
beginning in FY12.5

Figure 3: ESPA First Flight Configuration on STP1 Launch (9 March 2007)

Figure 2: Generic EELV ESPA Configuration
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A major advantage of CubeSats is their unobtrusiveness
to the launch vehicle integration process. A full P-POD
weighs just slightly over 5 kg and requires a simple
electrical initiation signal to activate a resistive-actuator
door release (the satellites themselves are deployed
from the P-POD using a simple spring) (Figure 6). The
genius of the P-POD is the containerization of the
CubeSats within a deployment device qualified to
NASA Standard 7001 mechanical workmanship
standards.7
In essence, the P-POD serves as a
“shipping container” that prevents even a catastrophic
CubeSat structural failure from escaping the P-POD
and damaging the launch vehicle during flight.8 Even
more importantly, the small size and mass of a P-POD
greatly simplifies the launch vehicle CLA process as
compared to larger satellite payloads. Whereas even
microsatellites still require detailed computer Finite
Element Models (FEMs) to numerically approximate a
complex system, the P-POD is like a flea on the back of
an elephant—CubeSats can be modeled with a simple
mass-spring-dashpot approach that outputs a relatively
straightforward (and deterministic) transfer function.
This dramatically shortens the time required for CLA
compared to normal FEM computer simulations.

MARCH OF THE CUBESATS
At the extreme low-end of satellite weight classes, a
revolution has occurred in the past decade for satellites
in the 0.5-10 kg range. This revolution is enabled by
technical standards for both the satellites themselves
and their launch vehicle dispensers. These so-called
CubeSats (named for their basic one-unit (1U) design, a
10 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm cube weighing no more than an
equivalent liter of water, or 1 kg) were first proposed at
the turn of the century to foster educational outreach for
high-school and college students via hands-on satellite
engineering (Figure 4). Given the processing power of
today’s commercial-off-the-shelf electronics, these tiny
satellites are enormously more powerful than the early
Explorer, Vanguard, and Pioneer satellites. The cost to
build CubeSats is incredibly inexpensive—from
$25,000 (a basic kit design and do-it-yourself labor) up
to $1-5M for complicated U.S. government scientific
projects (with labor and testing as the cost-driver)
(Figure 5). The cost to launch a CubeSat as a
secondary payload is also cheap, typically running from
$50,000 to $70,000 for a 1U CubeSat. These satellites
are today equipped with miniaturized Global
Positioning System (GPS) receivers, cell-phone digital
cameras, reaction wheels, radio transceivers and
microprocessors running mobile-device operating
systems.
Larger three-unit (3U) cubesats taking
advantage of the full volume of a standard CalPolyPicosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD) can now be
equipped with deployable solar arrays, antennas, and
cold-gas propulsion subsystems. Available power is
roughly 1 Watt (W) per 1U cube of surface area, with
roughly 1.5 Megabit (Mb)/day of downlink capacity. 6

Figure 5: NASA Ames GeneSat-1 (Launched 16
December 2006) as a Secondary Payload on a US
Minotaur I Launch
Critics have argued that CubeSats are nothing more
than toys. The rapid growth in smallsat technology
over the past decade (approximately 30 CubeSats
launched since 2003) challenges this view through the
on-orbit demonstration of growing CubeSat utility in
scientific and military endeavors. Today over 50
universities worldwide have active CubeSat programs.
Various U.S. scientific, defense technology and
industry CubeSat efforts are also underway. Leading
organizations include NASA, the DoD Space Test
Program (STP) within SDTW, the National Science

Figure 4: Cal Poly CubeSat CP-4 Photographed by
AeroCube-2 (Launched 17 April 2007 as Secondary
Payloads on a Russian Dnepr Launcher). Photo
Courtesy of The Aerospace Corporation.
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will be demonstrated as early as Summer 2010.10 These
improvements can substantially mitigate orbital debris
concerns.

Foundation, the National Reconnaissance Office,
CalPoly, AFRL, NRL, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Center (SMDC),
the ORS Office and Boeing Phantom Works.
CubeSats’ small size, low-cost, and ease of construction
have contributed to their proliferation across the
aerospace industry. Current example missions include
in-situ space weather monitoring, technology
maturation,
astrobiology,
atmospheric
density
measurement
and
beyond
line-of-sight
communications. Additional efforts are ongoing to
expand CubeSat capabilities into medium-resolution
earth sensing, unmanned ground sensor data
exfiltration,
tactical
electronic
support,
and
humanitarian relief missions. While it is true that
physics may limit what small-sized spacecraft may
achieve in some mission areas (such as large-optic
telescopes for high resolution), the rapid progress
achieved to date suggests these limits may be overstated
by CubeSat detractors.

CONCLUSION
The DoD Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept
published in 2004 made the following statements on
future space control concepts:11
By 2015, space control will be most
greatly enhanced by the joint force’s
ability to use space systems in a
highly-networked,
peer-to-peer
manner--to deny an adversary the
easy means of holding critical U.S.
space system link, user, terrestrial, or
space segments at risk . . . This will
be accomplished by proliferating,
networking,
protecting
and
integrating each of these segments in
a manner previously considered
unachievable. The combination of
low-cost production combined with
miniaturization
and
shared
understanding will enable both
response and denial options for
strategic deterrence . . .
Satellite design will migrate toward
small, single-purpose, distributed
constellations providing continuous
earth coverage. This will deny an
adversary the ability to easily target a
small number of critical nodes and
create a much-needed measure of
defensive redundancy.
Command
and control of these constellations
will rely heavily on automated
machine-to-machine
interfaces.
Terrestrial
ground
support
infrastructure will not be stovepiped
by specific mission area (i.e., ISR,
PNT, communications, etc.) but
instead will service a variety of
functions in a scalable, tailorable
fashion . . .

Figure 5: NASA Ames GeneSat-1 Partially Loaded
In a P-POD
Many analysts have also expressed concern that
CubeSat proliferation will greatly contribute to today’s
orbital debris challenges (aka “debris-sat”). Orbital
lifetime studies conducted for representative 1U
CubeSats shows that uncoordinated reentry will
normally occur within one year for orbital altitudes less
than 275 km, two years at an altitude of 400 km, ten
years for an altitude of 550 km, and 25 years (the U.S.
Government orbital debris mitigation standard) at an
altitude of 625 km; however, the addition of an
inexpensive 100-meter electrodynamic tether weighing
less than 0.6 kg can decrease these lifetimes to less than
a year for 525 km altitude, ten years at 800 km altitude
or 25 years at 1000 km height.9 The DoD STP, NASA
and AFRL are currently sponsoring technology
development efforts for other drag enhancing devices
(including extensible “sails” for small satellites) that
Nagy

To populate, replenish, and rapidly
reconstitute these constellations, lowcost responsive spacelift is essential.
This capability will allow the U.S. to
respond to an adversary [Weapon of
Mass Effect] attack by rapidly
reconstituting systems destroyed or
degraded
by
enemy
action.
Responsive
spacelift
requires
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mobility and proliferation that
reduces an adversary’s opportunity to
target systems while in preparation
for launch. Modular, production-line
methods that allow for “mass
customization” of satellites, launch
systems, terrestrial C2 and user
segments are required . . .
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